

VZCZCXRO0147  
OO RUEHCI  
DE RUEHKT #0581/01 0791207  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
O 201207Z MAR 07  
FM AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5325  
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 5522  
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 5824  
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 1033  
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 3840  
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 5147  
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1187  
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL KOLKATA PRIORITY 3281  
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2516  
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY  
RHMFISS/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY  
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY  
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY  
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 000581

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/2017

TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PTER](#) [ASEC](#) [NP](#)

SUBJECT: HOME MINISTER WILL ASK PRACHANDA TO INSTRUCT CADRE  
NOT TO HARM U.S. PERSONNEL

REF: KATHMANDU 525

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)

Summary

1. (C) On March 17, the Ambassador stressed to Home Minister Sitaula that, although he considered Maoist Supremo Prachanda's March 8 allegation of a royalist plot to kill U.S. officials (reftel) to be a hoax, the U.S. remained concerned. The Ambassador expressed appreciation for Prime Minister Koirala's public criticism of Prachanda's allegation and for the Prime Minister's acknowledgment that the Government of Nepal (GON) had no evidence. What was missing was an assurance that the Maoist chief had issued a clear instruction to his cadre not to harm U.S. Mission personnel. The Home Minister agreed to press Prachanda on the issue the same day. United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) head Ian Martin told the Ambassador March 16 that he had also spoken to Prachanda, as the Ambassador had requested, and Prachanda had claimed his intention had been to help not to harm.

No Evidence of a Royalist Plot

2. (C) The Ambassador met with Home Minister Sitaula March 17 to reiterate U.S. concern about Maoist Supremo Prachanda's March 8 allegation of a royalist plot to kill U.S. officials.

The Ambassador stated that he now considered the claim to have been a hoax. Prachanda had had ample opportunity to provide evidence to support his allegation and had not done so, despite various promises. The Ambassador stated that the explanation the Maoist chief had offered in a March 15 conversation with peace process observer Padma Ratna Tuladhar who then immediately conveyed it to Emboff was hardly credible. According to Tuladhar, Prachanda had said that an unidentified Maoist had passed the plot information to the Maoist chief while he was waiting to speak at the rally in Pokhara on March 8. The Supremo had not passed the information to the police or the U.S. Mission because he was worried that the royalists would act in the meantime. The peace process would have been jeopardized. Mentioning the plot in a public speech had been the best way to nip the plot in the bud, Prachanda had claimed. He had promised Tuladhar details that same evening. Sitaula reported that Prachanda

had told him a similar story: when the Home Minister had asked the basis for the allegation, Prachanda had claimed to have spoken out immediately after he heard about the plot from some friends in Kathmandu.

#### PM's Criticism; Clear Instruction to Cadre Needed

-----

13. (C) The Ambassador expressed his appreciation to the Home Minister for the Prime Minister's public criticism on March 12 of Prachanda's plot allegation. The Prime Minister had made clear that the GON had no evidence to support the Maoist chief's claim. This was useful and provided a measure of additional security. What was still missing now, the Ambassador stated, was an assurance that Prachanda had issued an instruction to his cadre not to harm U.S. Mission personnel. The Maoists had killed two U.S.-employed security guards a few years before, so the U.S. took these sort of threats seriously. The Ambassador urged Sitaula to convey this message to Prachanda and the Home Minister agreed to do so. Prachanda had no business saying such things about any country's personnel, Sitaula observed. Home Secretary Mainali, who was also present, concurred. Sitaula said he was planning to meet the Maoist leader later the same day and would pass the Ambassador's request on at that time.

#### Prachanda Downplays Plot With UN Chief

-----

14. (C) On March 16, UNMIN chief Ian Martin reported to the Ambassador that he had also spoken to Prachanda about the royalist allegation, as the Ambassador had requested (septel). Martin reported that he had specifically noted

KATHMANDU 00000581 002 OF 002

that the claim could have been misread to grant permission for lower-level Maoist cadre to kill Americans. The Maoist Supremo had replied that he did not understand why the Ambassador was so excited. He stated that the Maoists had never attacked foreigners. Prachanda had proceeded to give Martin the same explanation he had given Tuladhar, including a promise of information.

#### Still Waiting for Evidence or Proof of Maoist Order

-----

15. (C) Dr. Shekhar Koirala, who is Prime Minister Koirala's nephew and a key peace negotiator with the Maoists, told Emboff late March 17 that the Prime Minister and the Home Minister had met with Prachanda earlier in the day and demanded he fulfill the U.S. request for an order to his cadre. The Maoist chief had agreed to do so. As of close of business (local time) March 20, post had not yet received confirmation that Prachanda had issued such instructions. Post also still has not received any evidence to support allegations of a royalist plot. The Prime Minister's Foreign Policy Advisor, Dr. Suresh Chalise, assured the Deputy Chief of Mission March 20 that Prachanda had told the GON that confirmation of an instruction would be forthcoming.

#### Comment

-----

16. (C) Available evidence suggests that the reason the Maoist Supremo has provided no proof to back up his March 8 claim of a royalist assassination plot against U.S. officials is that he has no proof. His goal in making the statement was to smear the royalists and build up popular support for the Maoists. The surprise he indicated in his conversation with UN Mission in Nepal chief Ian Martin was probably genuine. Although it is possible that Prachanda was giving a signal to his cadre that it was open season on U.S. officials, it appears more likely that his goal was to blacken the royalists' name. Regardless, post will not let this allegation rest until we know that Prachanda has told his people to leave Americans alone.

